Risk equalisation in voluntary health
insurance markets: a three country
comparison
Francesco Paolucci, PhD.*
John Armstrong, Wynand van de Ven, Heather McLeod
*Research Fellow, ACERH, The Australian National University
Adjunct Lecturer, iBMG, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Francesco.Paolucci@anu.edu.au
THE UNIVERSITY OF

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Outline:

Special Issue in
‘Health Policy’

1. Editorial: „Risk equalisation in voluntary health insurance
markets‟ (Armstrong, Paolucci, van de Ven);
2. „Risk equalisation and voluntary health insurance markets: The
case of Australia‟ (Connelly, Paolucci, Butler, Collins);
3. „Risk equalisation and voluntary health insurance in Ireland‟
(Armstrong);
4. „Risk equalisation in the South African voluntary health
insurance market‟ (McLeod, Grobler);

5. Risk equalisation in voluntary health insurance
markets: a three country comparison.

Agenda
1. Overview of health financing in the 3countries;

2. Voluntary private health insurance (VPHI)
and risk-equalisation (RE) in the 3countries;
3. Conclusions and discussion.

Part 1.
Overview of health financing
in the 3-countries

Australia (1)
 Mix of public-private financing & delivery of
health services:

• Public health insurance (Medicare, 1984). (68%
of THE).
• Out-of-pocket payments. (24% of THE).
• Competitive VPHI. (8% of THE).

Australia (2)
 Medicare (1984):
• Tax funded universal mandatory coverage;
• „Free‟ treatment as a public patient in a public
hospital;
• Subsidies for private medical services (Medicare
Benefits Schedule) and pharmaceuticals
(Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme).

Australia (3)
 Competitive VPHI:
• Supplementary coverage for (parts of) the costs of services not
covered by Medicare (e.g. hospital charges levied by private
hospitals);
• Duplicate coverage for the costs of services (partly) covered by
Medicare;
• Non-substitutive;
• Individual-based insurance;
 Out-of-pocket payments:
• VPHI-Deductibles, POS-copayments.

Ireland (1)
 Public/private mix of funding & delivery
of healthcare (almost identical to Australia):
- Tax-funded public health insurance scheme;

- VPHI market;
- Out of pocket expenditures.

Ireland (2)
 VPHI market commenced in 1957 with
establishment of Vhi Healthcare & provides:
• Duplicative coverage to universal entitlement of
public hospitals*;
• Substitutive GP-care coverage for non- Medical
Card holders;
• Supplementary coverage.
• Employer based schemes (60%) or directly by
individuals.

South Africa (1)


Public/private financing & delivery of healthcare:

Public sector (40% of THE)

Private sector (60% of THE)

Universal tax-funded with allocated budgets for VPHI market (1889) known as „medical
schemes‟ since 1967 covering on a voluntary
public healthcare facilities.
basis 15% of the population (i.e. high-income
groups)
64% of the population depends on it for all
conventional healthcare services

A further 21% of the population use private
GP and pharmacies on OOP-basis and for the
rest relies on the public scheme

Salaried staff

FFS

Care is virtually „free‟ at the point of service for Deductibles and copayments
unemployed and low-income people (e.g. user
charges with exemption policies)

South Africa (2)


VPHI features:
- Substitutive coverage & delivery via private healthcare providers,
predominantly fee-for-service.

- Not for-profit MS, owned by their members.
- Brokers are paid commissions for taking members to open
schemes – 9,742 individual health brokers while there are only 7,000
GPs.
- Fiercely competitive market (i.e. high switching rates).

Part 2.
VPHI & RE in the 3-countries

Outline of VPHI markets
Australia

Ireland

South Africa

% population covered by
VPHI

47%

52%

15%

People covered by VPHI

10.9 million

2.2 million

7.8 million

VPHI expenses as % of
total national hc expenses

8%

12%

55%

Do consumers have free
choice of insurer to enroll
within?

Yes, 93% are
in open
schemes

Yes, 95% are
in open
schemes

Yes, 67%
enrolees in
open schemes

Financial responsibility of
individual insurance
entities

Very low.
Costs >AU$50,000
are shared.

100%

100%

Market structure for VPHI
Australia

Ireland

South Africa

25

3

41

Market share largest
insurer

30%

66%

25%

Market share largest 4
insurers

70%

100%

44%

Premium subsidies
and/or tax-credits for
PHI purchase?

Yes
(Rebate and Medicare
Levy Surcharge)

Yes

Yes (but no subsidies
for people earning
below tax-threshold

Premium restrictions?

Community-rated
premiums

Community-rated
premiums

Community-rated
premiums

Flexibility for benefit
package design

Very high

Very high

Very high

Number of open
undertakings

Common elements
VPHI-markets
 Flexibility for benefit package design is an
effective tool for market segmentation and thereby
undermines community rating: indirect
premium differentiation via product
differentiation.

 Adverse and risk selection are
significant problems!

Risk selection: tools
Australia
Preferred risk
selection by
insurers

 Selective
advertising;
 Premium
differentiation via
Product
differentiation;
 Voluntary
deductibles.

Ireland
 Selective
marketing;
 Restricted
product
enhancement;
 Voluntary
deductibles.

South Africa
 Selective
marketing;
 Benefits above
the presribed
minimum
benefits.

Subsidising VPHI: HOW?


Competitive VPHI markets require the
enforcement of regulations/subsidies to achieve
affordability, efficiency and prevent selection.



The current forms of subsidies for VPHI in the 3
countries:
a. Premium-adjusted subsidies;
b. Community rating per insurer per product;
c. Risk-adjusted subsidies (e.g. riskequalisation)?

a. Premium-adjusted
subsidies


Effective in achieving affordability.



But, not optimal:

•

They reduce the consumers‟ and insurers‟ incentives for
efficiency:
» Less effective price-competition and risk of
premium inflation;
» A welfare loss because of the moral hazard due
to over-insurance.

•

They create a misallocation of subsidies.

 tradeoff affordability - efficiency

b. Community rating
 Goal: to create implicit cross-subsidies from the low-risks
to the high-risks.

 Effect: Such pooling of people with different risks creates
substantial predictable profits and losses for subgroups 
and thereby create incentives for risk-selection.

 tradeoff affordability - selection

c. Risk-equalisation
 A usual definition of risk equalisation:
„A mechanism to equalise the risk profiles
among insurers with the objective that the ex-ante
risk profiles of each insurer become identical.‟
 This is done by calculating premium subsidies based
on risk-adjusted predicted individual health
expenses. These subsidies are given to the insurer
who deducts it from the premium of the relevant
consumer.

Modalities of risk equalisation
Modality 1:

C

Consumer
Modality 2:
Consumer

REF
S
P-S

REF
P-S+C

Insurer

S-C
Insurer

C=Contribution; S=Subsidy; P=Premium.

Effects of RE
 Eliminate incentives for riskselection;
 No distortions of premium
competition (efficiency);
 Achieve affordability in competitive
PHI markets.

Australia: is it RE?
 Although in Australia it is called „risk
equalisation‟, it is a claims cost equalisation (CE):
„A mechanism to equalise the claimscosts among insurers with the objective that
the ex-post costs per person of each insurer
become identical.‟
 This is done by enforcing ex-post costs-based
compensations between insurers.

Benefits/Services
Services covered under the Australian scheme (figures in
parentheses are the proportion of the total benefits being
equalised):
• Hospital benefits (97.6%)
• Hospital substitute benefits (0.05%)

• Chronic Disease Management Program benefits (0.07%)
• High Cost Claimant benefits (2.28%)

Flows
Insurer A

Insurer B

Insurer C

Insurer D

Sum of payments
into the RETF = Sum
of payments out of
the RTF (zero sum
game)

All insurers
notionally
deposit into AND
withfraw from
the RETF

Risk Equalisation Trust Fund (RETF)
Individual insurers
make or receive a
net transfer,
depending on
claims experience

Insurer E

Insurer F

Insurer G

Insurer H

‘Risk’ vs. ‘Claims cost’
 Risk equalisation:
A mechanism to equalise the risk profiles among
insurers with the objective that the ex-ante risk
profiles of each insurer become identical.

 Claims cost equalisation:
A mechanism to equalise the claims cost among
insurers with the objective that the ex-post costs per
person of each insurer become identical.

Effects of CE
 Highly imperfect matching with the „true‟ risk
structure of insurers‟ population resulting in
over/under compensations (i.e. misallocation of
subsidies).
 Strong incentives for selection (historically a
constant threat to the stability of PHI market in
Australia).

 Lack of incentives for efficiency.

The preferred strategy



Effects of ‘PAS’ and ‘CE’ : reduction of incentives for efficiency;
Effects of ‘CRP’: risk selection; and premium differentiation via
product differentiation.



Risk equalisation (RE) first-best strategy to escape from the
tradeoffs between affordability, efficiency and selection (van de
Ven & Schut 2008-7; Paolucci et al. 2006):
 In the case of perfect risk equalisation there is no need for any
other strategy and no tradeoff exists.
 Each of the other strategies inevitably confronts policymakers
with a tradeoff.

‘Risk Equalisation’
Australia

Ireland

South Africa

2007

No transfers
(most recent
regulations 2003)

planned for 2010, but
legislation still not
passed

Policy rationale for
„RE‟

To support CRP
(risk-solidarity)
To increase industry
stability i.e. prevent
selection

To support CRP
(risk-solidarity)
To increase industry
stability

To support CRP (risksolidarity)
To facilitate the
introduction of Social
Health Insurance

Risk factors

 age
 health status proxy,
i.e. a cap on the
maximum insurer‟s
costs per person over
a rolling 12-month
period.

 age, gender;
 reserve power for
health status proxy,
i.e. private bed nights.

 age;
 numbers with 25
defined chronic
diseases, with HIV and
with multiple chronic
diseases;
maternity events.

„RE‟: year of
implementation

Part 3.
Conclusions and discussion

Similarities between
A, I & SA
Similarities:
 Universal basic public system;
 Voluntary private health insurance (VPHI) market with
consumer choice of „level‟ of coverage and competition
among „risk-bearing‟ insurers;
 Regulation & subsidies in VPHI markets:
• Restrictions on the ability of insurers to charge risk-related premiums (i.e.
community rating);
• Other incentives and subsidies in place for particular policy objectives.

• Risk equalisation.

Differences
between A, I & SA
Differences:

 history;
 relative level of wealth;
 the role of VPHI in the overall health
system;
 ……
 Definition of ‘Risk Equalisation’!

Conclusions and discussion
 Risk selection is a signifcant problem;
 In case of voluntary health insurance: adverse selection is an
additional problem;
 Risk equalisation is very complex, both technically and
politically; and also the legal issues;
 Community rating: goal or tool?
 Rationale for (subsidising) VPHI?
 From VPHI towards NHI?

Community rating:
goal or tool?
 As a Goal: Each person in the community pays
more or less the same premium.

 As a Tool: Regulation that creates predictable
profits/losses, and thereby incentives for selection
that undermines the goal of community rating;
 Are there more effective tools to achieve the goal?

Rationale for (subsidising) VPHI?
1. What is the rationale for buying voluntary private health
insurance (VPHI), given a universal basic public system?
Answer: to pass the queue and reduce waiting times and
to receive care with better (perceived) quality.
2. What then is the rationale for subsidising (tax penalties,
premium subsidies 30-40%, „risk equalisation‟), and
regulating (open enrolment, community rating) VPHI?
Answer: reduce pressure on public system (& finance)
and increase choice.

From VPHI to SHI?
All 3-countries have been considering the introduction of Social Health
Insurance (NHI) in the sense of universal mandatory insurance with
consumer choice of (competing) health funds:
• Australia: National Health & Hospitals Reforms Commission
(NHHRC) – “Medicare Select”;
• Ireland: Fine Gael‟s “FairCare”;
• South Africa:
• „Social Health Insurance‟ proposed since 1994;
• New elected Government in 2009: “within 5 years” National
Health Insurance.

From VPHI to NHI:
Preconditions
Good risk equalisation;
Effective competition policy;
Consumer information (price, quality);
Transparency (e.g. insurance products);
Product classification system;
Supervision of quality of care;
Sufficient contracting freedom (price, quality, selective
contracting);
 Political support (bi-partisan) for sequential
implementation;
 ….., …., …..








Risk equalisation is
critical
 Good risk equalisation is an essential (but not the only)
precondition to efficient competitive health
insurance/provision markets (with open enrollment &
community rating).
 Without good risk equalisation the disadvantages of
competition might outweight advantages of a competitive
market.
 Risk equalisation should not only be based on age/gender,
but also on health status.

US reforms?
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
establishes various tiers of health insurance coverage for
three primary purposes:
• To set the universal mandatory coverage for a minimum
standardised package of services (or pay a federal tax penalty
beginning in 2014).
• Premium and cost-sharing subsidies provided to lower and
middle income people buying their own insurance in
Exchanges.

ACA (I)
 Four actuarial value levels: 60% (a bronze plan), 70% (a
sliver plan), 80% (a gold plan), and 90% (a platinum
plan).
 The ACA also requires that plans cap the maximum outof-pocket costs for enrollees, based on the out-of-pocket
limits in high-deductible plans that are eligible to be
paired with a Health Savings Account.
 Most people will be required to have insurance that is at
least at the bronze level (a 60% actuarial value) or pay a
federal tax penalty.

ACA (II)
 People who buy coverage on their own through an
Exchange and have family income up to four times the
poverty level ($89,400 for a family of four and $43,560 for
a single individual in 2011) may be eligible for premium
and cost-sharing subsidies:
• The premium subsidies are based on family income and the
premium (adjusted for age) of the second lowest cost silver plan
(70% actuarial value) in an Exchange.
• Low and modest income people buying insurance in
Exchanges may be eligible for coverage with a higher actuarial
value and lower out-of-pocket maximum.

Subsidies
a. Premium-related subsidies;
b. Cost-sharing subsidies;
c. Community rating per product.
•
•

Effects of a and b: reduction of incentives for efficiency
(e.g. premium inflation, moral hazard…);
Effects of c: risk selection; and premium differentiation
via product differentiation.

Why not risk-adjusted subsidies?

Universal Mandatory
Coverage
Many OECD countries have introduced
universal mandatory coverage for a uniform
benefits or services package (BP).
Policy-makers see universal/uniform
mandatory coverage as a tool to achieve the
goal of affordable access to (the coverage of)
health care services to vulnerable groups
(e.g. low-income or high-risks individuals).

Problem
 If the financing/insurance of uniform BP is not
sustainable/affordable for certain groups of
individuals it does not make sense to mandate to
buy it;
 If subsidies guarantee affordable access to health
care services/coverage for vulnerable groups, what
is the rationale for universal/uniform mandatory
coverage?

Proposition
 Proposition: the arguments that motivate a system
of mandatory cross-subsidies differ substantially
from those that motivate mandatory coverage.
 What are the economic rationales for governments
to enforce a system of mandatory cross-subsidies
and to implement mandatory coverage for a set of
predefined services?

Promising directions to
proceed
 Single-option scheme with voluntary income-related
deductibles (i.e. the higher the income, the higher the
deductible).
 Allow insurers to risk rate & replace community rating by a
premium rate band;
 Replace the premium and cost-sharing subsidies by riskadjusted subsidies.
Effects:
 Less selection, both by consumers and by insurers;
 Policy goal of affordability more likely to be achieved;
 Increase incentives for efficiency (consumers, insurers).

